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Abstract
The standard economic model of bilateral precaution postulates an interde-
pendency between the care taken by injurers and victims that operates through
the effects of each on the expected accident loss. This paper considers situations
in which each partys precaution affects not only expected accident loss, but also
directly affects the other partys cost of taking precaution. Generalizing the eco-
nomic model of tort law in this way allows for a more complete analysis of when
standard tort rules can and cannot induce optimal precaution. When this additional
externality is introduced into a model of unilateral harm (where all accident losses
are borne by the victim), none of the standard tort liability rules induces socially
optimal behavior by both parties. Moreover, under a contributory negligence rule,
the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies; this gives rise to the possibility of
litigation in equilibrium. A ’tort-like’ liability rule that induces socially optimal
behavior by both parties is then characterized; this involves a payment by vic-
tims to non-negligent injurers whenever an accident occurs. The model is then
extended to consider the case of bilateral harm (where both parties suffer accident
losses). It is shown that, as long as both parties can sue to recover their accident
losses, all negligence-based tort rules lead to socially optimal behavior by both
parties.
1) Introduction 
The standard economic model of accidents with bilateral precaution (as presented, for 
instance, in Shavell (1987, pp. 36f)) posits an interdependency between the levels of care taken 
by injurers and victims that affects the benefits from precaution (i.e. the accident losses 
prevented). On this basis, the model leads to the conclusion that, with legal standards of care set 
at the socially optimal levels, and with no litigation costs, uncertainty, misperception, error or 
wealth constraints,1 all negligence-based liability rules induce socially optimal behavior by both 
injurers and victims.2 Leong (1989) and Arlen (1990a, b; 1992) generalize the standard bilateral 
precaution model to accommodate bilateral harm (where accident losses are suffered by both 
parties). As long as each party can recover damages for its accident losses, the basic result is 
similar to that of the standard unilateral harm model: in the absence of litigation costs, 
uncertainty, misperception, error and wealth constraints, all negligence-based tort rules induce 
optimal behavior by both parties (Arlen, 1990a). 
In the standard bilateral precaution model, each party’s cost of care depends directly only 
on its own level of precaution. The interdependency between the two parties’ total accident costs 
occurs only via the effects of care on the expected loss from the accident. This paper addresses 
the other side of the issue, introducing a direct interdependency in the two parties’ costs of 
precaution. Thus, it analyzes situations in which a change in one party’s level of care also 
directly influences the cost to the other party of taking any given level of care. In essence, in the 
standard model, parties interact only by affecting the victim’s expected benefit from precaution.  
In the model presented in this paper, parties also interact by directly affecting (shifting) the other 
party’s supply of precaution. It may be thought that this cost-side interdependency would be 
symmetric in relation to the standard analysis, particularly as the labeling of ‘costs’ and 
‘benefits’ is somewhat arbitrary. However, we find that, when this externality is introduced into 
an otherwise standard unilateral harm model (where the accident losses are borne by only one 
party), none of the standard liability rules – no liability, strict liability, negligence, strict liability 
with a defense of negligence, negligence with a defense of contributory negligence, and 
comparative negligence (CN) – induce socially optimal care by both injurers and victims. 
                                                          
1 The standard model has its origins in the analysis of Brown (1973). See also e.g. Ordover (1978) on litigation 
costs, Craswell and Calfee (1986) on uncertainty, and Shavell (1986) on wealth constraints. 
2 The optimality result does not extend, in general, to the choice of activity level. This paper focuses on the choice of 
levels of care, and does not consider the issue of activity levels. 
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 The basic intuition for this result is that these tort rules allow for accident losses to be 
shifted between the parties, but makes no such provision for shifting precaution costs (in 
particular, there is no cause of action for one party to recover its precaution costs, or part thereof, 
from the other). Thus, for example, under a simple negligence rule, the injurer will comply with 
the standard of due care. Anticipating this, the victim will choose a level of care to minimize the 
sum of her accident losses and her costs of precaution, but has no incentive to consider the 
injurer’s precaution costs (which, under our assumptions, are affected by the victim’s choice of 
care). It might appear that this inefficiency could be corrected simply by the court adjusting the 
amount of damages awarded in order to account for the cost interdependency. However, it is 
shown below that it is not in fact possible to do so within the limitations of traditional tort rules. 
The fundamental problem is that optimality requires that the legal rule forces the victim to 
internalize the externality affecting the injurer’s costs. In principle, it is possible to do so by 
modifying the damages award in a manner that depends on victim precaution; however, this will 
impair the incentives for the injurer to take optimal care. In order to implement the social 
optimum, it is necessary to consider a wider class of rules. To illustrate this point, we 
characterize a ‘tort-like’ mechanism that induces optimal behavior by supplementing the 
injurer’s accident liability with a payment by the victim to non-negligent injurers whenever an 
accident occurs. Of course, this rule differs significantly from existing liability rules. 
A second result from this framework is that, under a contributory negligence rule, there is 
no equilibrium in pure strategies. Rather, the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies, which 
implies that the parties will choose (with some positive probability) to behave negligently in 
equilibrium. This gives rise to the possibility of successful litigation in equilibrium, in contrast to 
the standard model where parties who face negligence rules always satisfy the standard of care, 
so that, although there are some accidents, all parties are non-negligent. Existing answers to the 
question of why we have extensive, successful, tort litigation have focused on information 
deficiencies, error, and wealth constraints. This analysis reveals an additional possibility: in 
some cases, the structure of traditional tort rules cannot induce non-tortious behavior. 
We also extend the model to the case of bilateral harm (where both parties may suffer 
accident losses). In these circumstances, as long as both parties can sue to recover their accident 
losses, all negligence-based tort rules lead to socially optimal behavior by both parties. Finally, 
the paper considers the implications of these results for the circumstances in which tort law can 
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and cannot induce optimal behavior. It is argued that the results of this paper suggest that 
externalities can be internalized through tort liability rules if a legal standard of care and liability 
for damages are imposed on each party that creates externalities (regardless of how many 
different externalities the party generates). However, it is not necessary for the law to create as 
many causes of action as there are externalities. All that is needed is that there be a cause of 
action against each externalizing party and that courts can take account of all relevant 
externalities in setting legal standards. In the next section, we further explain the intuition that 
motivates this model, and provide some illustrative examples. The formal model for the 
unilateral harm case is presented in Section 3. This is then extended to the case of bilateral harm 
in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the wider implications of the results, and Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2) Examples 
 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the difference between the standard model (Shavell, 1987) and 
our extension of that model.  In each figure, the horizontal axis represents the injurer’s level of 
care (x), while the vertical axis represents costs (monetized to dollars). Following the modified 
Hand formula,3 the court defines reasonable care, x*, by comparing the marginal benefits of 
additional precaution with the marginal costs borne by the injurer in undertaking further 
precaution. Marginal benefits (MB) are assumed to be constant, while marginal costs (MC) are 
increasing in x. For bilateral accidents, marginal benefit is a function of both x and y (where y is 
the victim’s level of care). In the standard model, the injurer’s marginal cost is assumed to 
depend only on his own precaution (i.e. MC = MC(x)), as in Figure 1. The major innovation in 
this paper is quite simple – it is to allow for the possibility that the injurer’s (and victim’s) 
marginal cost can depend on both parties’ care, as in Figure 2 where the injurer’s marginal cost, 
MC = MC(x; y). 
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here] 
The implications of this innovation for the ability of conventional tort rules to induce socially 
optimal behavior are analyzed below in Sections 3 and 4. A more concrete sense of situations 
described by this extended model can be gained by looking a few examples focusing on auto 
accidents. 
                                                          
3 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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 One way that drivers take precaution is by maintaining a safe following distance.  The 
effort cost of doing so depends on the behavior of other drivers. The forms of precaution taken 
by other drivers on a multi-lane highway may take various forms: also maintaining safe 
following distance behind other cars, signaling lane changes, observing maximum and minimum 
speed restrictions, traveling at a speed consistent with the flow of traffic. Different types of 
precaution also involve different types of costs: delay in arriving at one’s destination, the degree 
of attention one has to pay to driving, the level of tension experienced in paying attention, or the 
opportunity cost of not being able to pay attention to the scenery or planning future activities.   
Consider the following scenario. One driver takes precaution by maintaining a safe 
following distance; the opportunity cost is the amount of productive thought that can be given to 
tomorrow’s work activities. Another driver takes precaution by signaling lane changes and 
allowing sufficient distance between other vehicles before doing so. This is done at the cost of 
delay in arriving at her destination. The standard model recognizes that the level of precaution 
exercised by this driver in changing lanes affects the probability and perhaps severity of an 
accident. Our model recognizes that the level of precaution exercised by the driver changing 
lanes also affects the effort (cost) the other driver has to exercise in maintaining a given, safe, 
following distance. If the driver changes lanes with little precaution, weaving rapidly between 
lanes without signaling, cutting in closely in front of other cars in an effort to maintain a higher 
average speed he or she will also affect the other drivers’ costs of precaution. The driver trying to 
maintain a safe following distance has to shift more attention from planning the next days 
activities to driving or may experience more tension in driving. In other words, the other driver’s 
cost function has shifted out. 
In recent years, sport utility vehicles (SUVs) have gained widespread popularity. One of 
the motivations for purchasing SUVs is that they are taller than most cars. As a result, the SUV 
driver sits higher than surrounding traffic and finds it easier to observe traffic. Consequently, it is 
less costly to see and anticipate other drivers’ actions (i.e. to take precaution). The standard 
model would recognize that the purchase of an SUV shifts in the owner’s cost of precaution and 
by affecting their level of precaution, affects expected accident loss. But those who continue to 
drive cars also find themselves behind taller, and sometimes wider, vehicles. It is now more 
costly for the car driver to observe and anticipate others’ actions. For example, they may be 
forced to move to the edge of their lane to try to see around the wider, higher vehicle. The 
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precautionary activity of the SUV driver has shifted the cost to the car driver of taking 
precaution. The standard model does not capture this impact of the purchase of SUVs on other 
drivers’ cost of taking care, while our model does so. 
 Finally, consider a less realistic scenario that nonetheless illustrates the model’s intuition 
particularly well. Suppose that the injurer is a driver and the victim a cyclist, and that the parties 
are racing, so that each party’s utility depends on its speed relative to that of the other party.4 
Each party can take precaution to avoid an accident by reducing speed. However, even if the 
probability of an accident is zero, each party still cares (directly) about the other’s level of 
precaution (i.e. speed). Moreover, the parties’ precaution costs are directly interdependent, in the 
sense that, when the cyclist slows down, the driver suffers less disutility from any given 
reduction in her own speed. Suppose that the law requires the driver to drive no faster than the 
socially optimal speed in order to avoid liability, and that the expected accident liability is 
sufficiently large to induce the driver to satisfy this standard of care. In the standard analysis, the 
cyclist would then internalize all accident losses, and take socially optimal care. However, in our 
scenario, the cyclist’s care (i.e. reduction in speed) has two distinct effects – one is to reduce the 
expected accident loss, and the other is to reduce the cost to the driver of satisfying the legal 
standard. The cyclist will take the former fully into account, but has no incentive to consider the 
latter. Therefore, the cyclist will ride faster than is socially optimal, while the driver will satisfy 
the standard, but will have to incur a greater cost to do so than if the cyclist were behaving in a 
socially optimal manner. 
 The foregoing examples suggest scenarios in which our model may be applicable. 
Another source of evidence on the empirical relevance of the model is provided by the factors 
considered by courts in their choice of negligence standards. In particular, when justifying the 
imposition of a particular negligence standard, courts have on occasion explicitly referred in their 
opinions to the effects of a party’s care on the other party’s cost of care. For instance, in Andrews 
v. United Airlines,5 the issue was whether the airline had been negligent in failing to prevent a 
                                                          
4 Emons and Sobel (1991) use a driver-cyclist example, although without the cost interdependency that we 
introduce. 
5 Andrews v. United Airlines, 24 F-3d 39 (9th Cir. 1984). Another case that highlights the significance of cost 
interdependencies is Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. (166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929)). The plaintiff was injured 
while riding “The Flopper”, an attraction at an amusement park. The salient feature of this case is that any 
precaution taken by the defendant (by, for instance, making the ride safer) would have directly impacted on the 
plaintiff’s utility (which depended in part on the risk associated with the ride). We are grateful to Warren Schwartz 
for suggesting these examples. 
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briefcase from falling from an overhead compartment and striking the plaintiff. In particular, the 
question was whether the airline should have installed netting in the overhead bins to reduce the 
probability that an object would fall. The court recognized that, even if installation of the netting 
would be a cost effective way to reduce expected harm, it may not be optimal because of the 
associated increase in the disutility experienced by passengers. 
 
3) The Case of Unilateral Harm 
 3.1) The Model 
The model developed in this paper follows the standard analysis of accidents between 
strangers with bilateral precaution, as presented in Shavell (1987, pp. 36f). All injurers (I) are 
assumed to be identical, as are all victims (V).  As in past models, all actors are assumed to be 
risk neutral. Each party can take precaution that reduces the expected loss from an accident (i.e. 
reducing the probability of the accident, the harm if it does occur, or some combination of the 
two), and faces a cost of taking such precaution. In this section a unilateral harm framework is 
assumed; thus, if an accident occurs in spite of these precautions, the losses are borne directly 
only by V. Depending on the liability rule that applies, I may or may not be required to 
compensate V. If such a payment is made, it is assumed to perfectly compensate V for the 
accident loss (thus, these losses are purely pecuniary in nature). 
It is assumed that the parties have complete information about their payoffs and the 
applicable legal rules and standards, share common prior beliefs about the probability of the 
accident, and are not subject to error in their choice of actions.  Parties are assumed to choose 
their level of care so as to minimize the sum of their own costs of precaution and expected 
liability from accidents, given the governing tort rules. Courts are similarly assumed to have 
perfect information about costs, expected damages and the relationships between care and 
expected damages. Where tort rules involve negligence, courts are assumed to set the due care 
standard at the social cost-minimizing level. We will refer to this as the socially optimal or 
efficient level of care. 
 In the standard bilateral precaution model, the social objective function is to minimize 
the sum of expected accident losses and the costs of precaution: 
x + y + L(x, y)                                                                    (1)    
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where x denotes I’s precaution, y denotes V’s precaution, and L is the expected accident loss 
(Shavell, 1987, p. 37).  The notion of bilateral precaution is captured in the assumption that L is a 
function of both x and y. In this formulation, expenditures on precaution are used as the 
numeraire, so that CI(x) = x, where CI(x) is I’s cost of taking precaution level x. Similarly, CV(y) 
= y, where CV(y) is V’s cost of taking precaution level y. 
Our extension of the standard model raises the question of how to appropriately represent 
the way in which courts set due care standards.6 As a general matter, a conceptual distinction can 
be drawn between the level of care taken by a party (characterized in terms of that party’s 
behavior) and the cost (whether a dollar amount or some nonmonetary cost) associated with that 
care. In the standard model, this distinction does not matter, as there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the expenditures on care and the level of precaution. That is, the cost 
(C) of care is used as the unit by which the level (x) of care is measured (so that x ≡ C(x)). As 
long as a party’s costs of care depend solely on its own behavior, this simplifying assumption 
does not affect the results of the analysis. However, where a party’s cost of care may also depend 
on the other party’s behavior (i.e. where C = C(x; y)) the distinction between levels and costs of 
precaution becomes significant. As a result, the issue of whether courts define standards of care 
in terms of costs or levels must be faced. In practice, courts almost invariably describe standards 
of care in terms of the party’s behavior (e.g. the speed at which they were travelling) rather than 
in terms of the expenditure on care.7 Thus, we assume that while courts define reasonable care as 
a level of care such that the costs do not outweigh the benefits of taking care, the standard that an 
injurer faces is a standard of behavior, i.e. a level of care, x.8 
                                                          
6 For a discussion of various issues relating to what is meant by a standard of care, see Schwartz (1989). 
7 For instance, in the classic case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., supra note 3, Judge Hand’s assessment of 
whether the barge owner was negligent focused on whether or not a bargee was present on the barge, rather than on 
the wages that the bargee would have had to be paid. 
8 In other respects, we follow the standard model. For instance, we retain the assumption that the court sets the 
standard of care for each party at the socially optimal level of care for that party to take, given that the other party 
takes socially optimal care. A party who meets this standard of care will not be found negligent, even though the 
other party chooses to behave negligently. That is, the standard does not vary with the behavior of the other party. 
Conceptually, a court could set a standard of care, x*, that depends on the other party’s behavior, so that x* 
= x(y), where x is the potential injurer’s care and y is the potential victim’s care. In practice, courts do not do so, 
instead setting a standard of reasonable behavior for each party that does not change with the other party’s behavior. 
There is a narrow area of exception to this under the ‘last clear chance’ doctrine, where the defendant can be held 
liable despite the plaintiff’s negligence if the defendant could have acted to avoid the accident given the plaintiff’s 
negligent behavior - see Dunn Bus Service v. McKinley 130 Fla.778, 178 So. 865 (1937). For an economic analysis, 
of the ‘last clear chance’ doctrine, see Wittman (1981). 
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This section examines how the results of the standard model change when there are 
interdependencies between the two parties’ costs of precaution. That is, one or both of the 
parties’ costs of taking precaution depend not only on their own actions, but also on the other 
party’s action, i.e. CI = CI(x; y) and CV = CV(y; x).  The social objective, as in Shavell (1987), is 
to minimize the sum of the costs of precaution and expected accident loss. However, this now 
takes account of the possible interdependence between the victim and injurer’s costs of 
precaution: 
CI(x; y) + CV(y; x) + L(x, y)                       (2) 
Here, CI denotes I’s cost of precaution, and CV denotes V’s cost of precaution. The possible 
interdependence between them is captured by including both x and y, which now denote the 
levels of care taken by I and V, respectively, as arguments in each cost function. It should be 
noted that the focus here is on the general case, where both CI and CV each depend on both x and 
y. It is also possible to analyze two special cases, one where CI depends only on x while CV 
depends on both x and y, and the other where CI depends on both x and y, while CV depends only 
on y. These special cases are solved separately in Dharmapala, Hoffmann and Schwartz (2001). 
Following Shavell (1987, p. 36), we assume that the accident loss is non-negative and 
decreasing at an increasing rate in both I’s and V’s precaution levels: 
A1: (i) L(x, y) ≥ 0, (ii) Lx < 0, (iii) Ly < 0, (iv) Lxx > 0, (v) Lyy > 0. 
It will be assumed that each actor’s cost is increasing and convex in her own level of precaution, 
so that: 
A2: (i) CIx > 0, (ii) CVy > 0, (iii) CIxx > 0, (iv) CVyy > 0. 
While it is possible that one party’s care may render the other’s precaution more costly, the focus 
here is on the case of positive externalities in costs of precaution. It is assumed that a higher level 
of care by one party lowers the other party’s cost of care: 
A3: (i) CIy ≤ 0, (ii) CVx ≤ 0. 
This assumption changes only the direction of deviation of equilibrium care from socially 
optimal care, not the basic efficiency results of this paper. 
A further assumption is that the accident losses L are ‘sufficiently large’ relative to the 
costs of precaution, in the following sense:  
A4: (i) For any y, and any x < x*, L(x, y) > CI(x*; y) - CI(y; x). 
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Thus, if courts impose a standard of care x* on I, it is assumed that the cost savings that I can 
achieve by taking less care than required by the standard are always exceeded by the increase in 
the expected accident losses (and hence, under a negligence rule, in the expected liability). This 
assumption maintains the discrete jump between the injurer’s expected losses for levels of 
precaution below and at or above the social optimum that the standard model depends on to 
assure that the injurer takes optimal precaution under negligence rules (Shavell, 1987, p. 35). 
It should be emphasized that this is not as restrictive an assumption as it may appear at 
first. Suppose that the court can impose, in addition to damages L that compensate V for the 
accident loss, a punitive penalty, represented by a nonnegative constant D, on I. Then, even if 
A4(i) is not satisfied, it will always be possible to choose a D such that D + L exceeds the right 
hand side of the expression in A4(i).  
An analogous assumption is made for V: 
A4: (ii) For any x, and any y < y*, L(x, y) > CV(y*; x) – CV(y; x). 
The assumptions A4(i) and A4(ii) may seem strong. However, it should be remembered that, 
without these assumptions, a party on which a negligence rule is imposed will not, in general, 
choose to satisfy that standard. The central results of this section are the nonoptimality of 
behavior under the standard tort rules, even when A4 holds. Thus, relaxing A4 would simply 
reinforce this basic result, by making nonoptimal behavior even more pervasive.9 In this sense, 
A4 is a conservative assumption, making the best possible case for the efficiency of standard tort 
rules. 
 3.2) Results 
This section analyzes the behavior of I and V under six different tort liability rules: no 
liability (NL), strict liability (SL), simple negligence (N), strict liability with a defense of 
contributory negligence (SLdN), negligence with a defense of contributory negligence (NdN), 
and comparative negligence (CN). We follow standard definitions of these rules (see Shavell 
(1987, Ch. 2), and Cooter and Ulen (1997)). In the case of CN, we assume that when both parties 
are negligent, liability is shared; however, we do not specify a particular sharing rule.10 In each 
                                                          
9 Additional assumptions to ensure that the SOCs for the minimization of Eq (2) are satisfied, are discussed in the 
Appendix. 
10 Various sharing rules have been used with CN over time. Early admiralty cases split liability 50/50, while some 
variants only require sharing of liability when the victim’s actions have contributed at least 50 percent to the 
probability of the accident. We follow the more common case of applying comparative negligence whenever both 
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of the rules that involves a negligence standard, we follow the previous literature and assume that 
the court sets the standard of care at the socially optimal level of care, x = x* and/or y = y*, as 
applicable, with no uncertainty or error.11 
Minimizing the social loss of accidents (Eq. (2)) with respect to x and y, the FOCs are: 
    CxI(x, y) + CxV(x, y) + Lx(x, y) = 0            (3) 
    CyI(x; y) + CyV(y; x) + Ly(x, y) = 0                                  (4) 
Assuming an interior solution, these FOCs define the socially optimal x* and y*, given the social 
loss function above. The results of this section can be summarized as follows.12 None of the 
standard tort rules induce socially optimal behavior (x*, y*) by both I and V. Consider, for 
instance, rule N. As in the standard model, I will always satisfy the standard of due care x*, in 
order to avoid the discontinuous leap in accident liability that results from failing to satisfy it. 
Given that I satisfies x*, V will anticipate bearing all of her own accident losses; thus V will 
minimize the sum of expected accident losses and her own precaution costs. However, V will not 
take into account the precaution costs faced by I (which are affected by V’s choice of y). This 
leads V to take a lower level of care than is socially optimal. I will thus satisfy the standard, but 
will incur a higher cost in doing so than if V were behaving optimally. 
This intuition can also be represented in terms of the simple diagrams in Figures 1 and 2. 
Suppose that the victim takes less than socially optimal care (y′ < y*). In both diagrams, this 
shifts the MB curve downward. In the standard model, the victim’s action has no effect on the 
injurer’s MC function (Figure 1), but in our model the change in y also shifts the injurer’s MC 
function upward (Figure 2). In neither case does y affect the standard of care x* to which the 
injurer is held, and, in both models, the injurer always satisfies the standard of care, x*, under a 
negligence rule, regardless of the victim’s action. In the standard model, should the victim 
choose to exercise less than socially optimal care, the injurer will still meet the due care standard, 
x*, and the injurer’s total cost of precaution will not change with the victim’s action. What does 
change is that the total social benefit (expected accident loss) resulting from both parties’ care is 
reduced (see Figure 1).  Now consider our model, in which the victim’s care affects the injurer’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
parties are negligent (the most widely used approach apportions liability relative to fault). In the standard full 
information rational actor model, CN is efficient regardless of the apportionment rule (Rea, 1987). 
11 Following the standard assumption about causality rules, it is assumed that, when a negligence standard is 
imposed on I, then I is assumed to have caused the entire accident loss suffered by V, rather than just the amount 
attributable to I’s negligence (see Grady (1984) and Kahan (1989) for a discussion of this issue). 
12 A more formal statement of these results is presented in Proposition 1 in the Appendix. 
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costs of care (Figure 2). Suppose that the injurer continues to meet the standard of care, x*. Now, 
should the victim decide to take less than socially optimal care, not only is total social benefit 
reduced, but the injurer’s total (and marginal) cost of taking socially optimal care also increases. 
These results imply that, in the unilateral harm case with intrinsically interdependent 
costs of care, no tort rule induces socially optimal behavior. For instance, N provides I with 
incentives to take optimal precaution, but does not confront the V with either the external impact 
of her precaution on I’s cost of precaution or with the necessity of complying with a legal 
standard of care in order to avoid bearing the accident cost. Similarly, under SLdN, V must 
comply with the negligence standard to avoid bearing the accident cost. However, under SLdN, I 
is motivated only to minimize her own cost of precaution and the accident cost. I therefore 
ignores the external impact of her action on V’s cost of precaution, and fails to take socially 
optimal precaution. Under CN, V neither faces this external impact nor can fully avoid bearing 
accident cost by meeting a court-determined standard of care. As a result, V will not take socially 
optimal precaution and CN cannot induce socially optimal precaution from both parties. 
It may appear at first that the results are simply due to our assumptions about the level of 
damages set by the court. In particular, it might seem that the inefficiency could be corrected 
simply by the court adjusting the amount of damages awarded in order to account for the cost 
interdependency. However, it can be shown that it is not in fact possible to do so within the 
limitations of traditional tort rules. Optimality requires that the legal rule forces the victim to 
internalize the externality imposed by her choice of y on the injurer’s costs CI(x; y). In principle, 
it is possible to do this by setting a damages award (denoted D) that does not simply equal the 
accident loss L(x, y); D could, rather, be set to punish the victim for suboptimal precaution. 
However, this will impair the incentives for the injurer to take optimal care. To illustrate this 
point, suppose that (under rule N) V takes optimal care (y = y*); then, I faces costs: 
CI(x; y*) + D 
Clearly, setting any D other than D = L(x, y*) will lead I to choose an x that differs from x*; 
conversely, of course, if D is set so that I chooses x*, V will not find it privately optimal to 
choose y*. Thus, manipulating the level of damages under rule N cannot induce socially optimal 
behavior by both parties. This point can be reiterated for each of the standard tort rules (in 
Section 3.3 below, however, we characterize a more general ‘tort-like’ mechanism that does 
implement the social optimum). 
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In the case of NdN, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. It can be shown, however, 
that there exists a (unique) equilibrium in mixed strategies under NdN. Note first that, from the 
proof of the nonexistence of pure-strategy equilibria in Proposition 1 (see the Appendix), I’s best 
responses to any of V’s pure strategies involve taking precaution level x equal to either x* or 0. 
Similarly, V’s best responses to any of I’s pure strategies involve taking precaution level y equal 
to y* or yN. Thus, it is possible to simplify the game induced by the NdN rule to one with a finite 
number of strategies (i.e. 2) for each player. The existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies 
follows straightforwardly from Nash’s existence theorem. 
Given the above simplification, any pair of mixed strategies can be represented by the 
parameters r, q ∈ [0,1], where r is the probability that I plays x* and q is the probability that V 
plays y*.  It follows that the probability that I plays 0 is  (1 – r) and the probability that V plays 
yN is (1 – q). Proposition 3 in the Appendix establishes the existence of a unique equilibrium in 
which each party randomizes over its possible pure strategies, sometimes satisfying the legal 
standard of due care, and at other times failing to do so. The most interesting implication of this 
result is the possibility of trials in equilibrium. In the standard model of liability under perfect 
information, the legal standard is always satisfied by the party upon whom it is imposed; thus, no 
party is ever negligent in equilibrium, so that litigation never occurs. Of course, accidents do 
occur in equilibrium, but they are never the result of negligent behavior. This also extends to the 
previous analysis of this paper – for instance, under N, as analyzed above, I always satisfies the 
standard x*, so that there is no litigation in equilibrium. 
However, the analysis of NdN in this paper yields substantially different implications. 
There is now a positive probability that, in equilibrium, one or both of the parties will fail to 
satisfy the standard. In some of these circumstances, trials will occur in equilibrium. In 
particular, consider the case where I plays x = 0 and V plays y = y*. The equilibrium strategy 
specified in Proposition 2 involves I playing 0 with probability (1 - r0) and V playing y* with 
probability q0. Thus, there is a probability (1 - r0)q0 that I will be negligent, while V satisfies the 
standard required to avoid contributory negligence. This situation could result in V successfully 
suing I to recover the accident loss, and thus involves a trial in which I is correctly found to have 
been negligent. 
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3.3) An Optimal Tort Rule 
The basic result above was that, when the structure of social costs is given by Eq. (2), 
none of the standard tort rules induce optimal behavior by both I and V. This naturally leads to 
the question of whether there exists some other mechanism that can induce optimal behavior. In 
fact, there is a large class of mechanisms that can implement the social optimum, namely 
regulation. All that is needed is that the regulator requires I to choose x* and V to choose y*, and 
that the regulation is backed by sufficient enforcement to dissuade I and V from deviating from 
these levels of care.13 However, such regulatory mechanisms have heavy information 
requirements, generally suffer from high enforcement costs and do not provide ex post 
compensation to injured parties. As a result, there are reasons why a society would want a tort 
rule instead of or in addition to a regulatory mechanism.14  
An important question thus remains – is there a ‘tort-like’ mechanism that can induce 
optimal behavior. Our goal is to find a mechanism that retains as many features of torts as 
possible and implements the social optimum. We will consider a mechanism to be ‘tort-like’ if it 
satisfies the following conditions: 
C1) It is only triggered ex post: i.e. transfers are made only in states of the world in which 
an accident has occurred. In contrast, regulation applies ex ante to all states of the world. 
C2) Budget balance: i.e. transfers are made only between the parties (I and V); no fines, 
taxes, or subsidies are imposed or provided by the government. In contrast, regulation 
requires an enforcement budget and a system of fines or other punishments, so that 
regulatory mechanisms may run either a budget surplus or deficit. 
In order to derive a tort-like rule that implements the social optimum, it is necessary to 
reexamine and ‘decompose’ the accident loss function L(x, y). Recall that L captures both the 
probability and the severity of an accident; thus, it can also be written as follows:15 
     L(x, y) = p(x, y)H(x, y)               (5) 
                                                          
13 It is worth pointing out that imposing strict liability on both parties,which generally induces optimal behavior in 
the standard model (in the absence of collusive behavior) will not do so in our model. The parties will take 
suboptimal care because of the cost externality, even when each faces the full losses from accidents.  This is 
sometimes referred to as ‘Earl Thompson’s liability rule’ – see Hindley and Bishop (1983). 
14 For analyses of the relationship between regulation and tort law, see, for instance, Shavell (1984a, b), Kolstad, 
Ulen and Johnson (1990) and Schmitz (2000). 
15 This distinction was not relevant to the preceding analysis; thus, it was convenient to simply work with L(x, y). 
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where p is the probability of an accident and H is the harm that results if an accident occurs (note 
that each of these depends on both x and y). 
 Now consider a rule that we will call negligence with compensation for increased costs of 
precaution (NCC). This is a simple negligence rule augmented by the payment by V to I of 
compensation for I’s increased costs of precaution.16  The rule can be specified as follows: 
NCC: If an accident occurs, and I is negligent (i.e. x < x*), then I pays damages L(x, y) to V. If 
I is non-negligent (i.e. x ≥ x*), then V bears her own accident losses, and also pays I an 
amount [CI(x*, y)/p(x*, y)].   
 
Given the assumption of risk-neutrality, NCC leads to socially optimal behavior by both I and V. 
A formal statement and proof of this result are provided in the Appendix. The basic intuition is 
as follows. When I takes care x and V takes care y, the probability of an accident is p(x, y). If I 
chooses x*, she receives a payoff of 0, regardless of V’s choice of y (note that the probability of 
being involved in an accident p(x*, y) and the denominator of the transfer from V if there is an 
accident cancel out). In expectation, I bears zero precaution costs and bears no accident liability. 
However, if I were to take suboptimal precaution, she would face both her own precaution costs 
and the expected accident losses. Thus, I will always satisfy the standard of due care. Given this, 
V faces not only her own precaution costs and the accident losses, but also bears the expected 
value of I’s precaution costs (through the transfers made when accidents occur). Thus, V’s 
decision problem is aligned with the social planner’s, so that V chooses the socially optimal level 
of precaution y*. 
 Clearly, although it is ‘tort-like’ in the sense that we have defined, NCC bears little 
resemblance to real-world liability rules and is an unlikely candidate for actual adoption by 
                                                          
16 It should be noted that the payment from V to I is not because I has a cause of action against V for bringing a 
frivolous suit. The compensation V pays to I is for increased costs I bears in taking precaution to prevent V’s injury, 
i.e. in meeting the legal standard of care, not for the costs imposed by a baseless suit. A ‘frivolous suit’ is “litigation 
. . . instituted solely with the intent of harming the other party without either excuse or justification. ... Under some 
authority, the existing torts of malicious abuse and malicious use of process have been re-defined as a single cause 
of action for abusive litigation.  Under the common-law claim, any party who asserts a claim, defense or other 
position with respect to which there exists such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it 
could not reasonably be believed that a court would accept it, or any party who brings and defends an action... that 
lacks substantial justification ... shall be liable in tort to the opposing party who suffers damage thereby.” (86 C.J.S. 
Torts Sec. 86.7 (1997)). 
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courts. This simply underlines the point that it requires a very unusual mechanism to induce 
socially optimal behavior by both parties under these circumstances. 
 
4) The Case of Bilateral Harm 
 In real-world accidents, it is often the case that harm is suffered by both parties, rather 
than only by V. Thus, Leong (1989) and Arlen (1990a, b; 1992) generalize the standard bilateral 
precaution model to accommodate bilateral harm.  They find that, as long as each party can 
recover damages for its accident losses, and in the absence of litigation costs, uncertainty, 
misperception, error and wealth constraints, all negligence-based tort rules induce optimal 
behavior by both parties (Arlen, 1990a). This section of the paper extends the unilateral harm 
model of Section 3 to the case of bilateral harm. Thus, the model in this section involves both 
bilateral precaution and bilateral cost externalities (as in Section 3) as well as bilateral harm. To 
facilitate comparisons with our earlier results, the notation involving I and V will be retained, 
although, of course, these terms are less meaningful when both parties suffer harm. The standard 
tort rules will be assumed to generalize straightforwardly to the bilateral harm context (as in 
Arlen (1990a)); thus, under a negligence rule (N) I can sue V to recover her accident losses if V 
is negligent, and V can sue I when I is negligent.  
The social cost of accidents in the bilateral harm context can be represented as: 
        CI(x; y) + CV(y; x) + LI(x, y) + LV(x, y)                       (6) 
where LV(x, y) is the expected accident loss faced by V, and LI(x, y) is the expected accident loss 
faced by I. The set of assumptions required is closely analogous to that in Section 3, and these 
are specified formally in the Appendix (Assumptions A5-A9). These assumptions require that 
the accident losses LI and LV are ‘sufficiently large’ relative to the costs of precaution (or, more 
specifically, to the precaution costs that a party can avoid by failing to take care). Thus, they are 
straightforward generalizations of those in Section 3.   
The court imposes social cost minimizing standards of  care, x*(y*) and y*(x*), on both 
parties. The basic result (stated formally in Proposition 4 in the Appendix) is that all of the 
standard negligence-based tort rules – N, SLdN, NdN and CN – induce each party to take this 
socially optimal level of care. The intuition can be clarified by considering the basic negligence 
rule, N. Each party faces a choice between satisfying the standard of due care (x* for I and y* for 
V) and thereby avoiding all liability for the other party’s accident losses, or failing to satisfy the 
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standard and bearing all of the other party’s accident losses. Provided that the other party’s losses 
are sufficiently large, relative to the savings in precaution costs by failing to take care, each party 
will find it in her interest to satisfy the standard, regardless of the behavior of the other party. 
There is thus a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies, (x*, y*); moreover, this coincides with 
the social optimum. Analogous (though somewhat more complicated) reasoning establishes that 
each of the other negligence-based rules also induces socially optimal behavior.   
 It is important to note that the intrinsic interdependency between the costs of precaution 
of the two parties does not lead to suboptimal behavior in the bilateral harm case. This is because 
each party faces a standard of due care, which, by assumption, is defined by the court so as to 
take into account the cost externality. A party that fails to satisfy this standard will face a 
discontinuous jump in its expected costs, as it will be forced to bear the accident losses of the 
other party. This results in the cost externality being internalized by each party (along with the 
accident externality). The lesson of this section is thus that, in the bilateral harm case (in contrast 
to the unilateral harm case) traditional tort rules are robust to the introduction of cost 
externalities.  
  
5) Discussion 
 Having analyzed both the unilateral and bilateral harm cases, it remains to review the 
paper’s results and to draw some more general conclusions concerning the design of tort liability 
rules. The results from sections 3 and 4 are summarized in Table 1, along with results from the 
existing literature.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The first two of these are the results of the standard models with independent costs of precaution, 
for the unilateral harm and bilateral harm cases (as discussed, for instance, in Shavell (1987) and 
Arlen (1990a), respectively). The next two, which are explicitly derived in Dharmapala et al. 
(2001), are special cases of the results in Proposition 1 (Section 3). 
Model 3 considers the case where, within a unilateral harm framework, V’s precaution 
costs are affected by I’s level of care, but where I’s cost of care is independent of V’s precaution. 
In these circumstances, courts can set a negligence standard for I that takes into account the 
external effects of I’s precaution on V’s costs. Given that the accident loss is sufficiently large, I 
will always choose to adhere to this standard, as failing to do so entails a large discontinuous 
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jump in expected liability. Given that I takes the socially optimal level of care, V’s problem (of 
choosing y to maximize CV(y; x*) + LV(x*, y)) is identical to the social planner’s program in 
choosing y. Thus, all of the negligence-based tort rules lead to optimal behavior by both I and V.  
The fourth model is also one of unilateral harm, and involves the case where I’s 
precaution costs are affected by V’s level of care, but where V’s cost of care is independent of 
I’s precaution. Once again, I will adhere to the standard of care imposed by the court. 
Anticipating this, V knows that she will bear her accident losses and her own costs of precaution; 
however, she does not bear I’s precaution costs, although these depend in part on her actions, and 
so will not choose the socially optimal level of care (this is essentially the same intuition as that 
in Section 3). Thus, the standard tort rules do not induce both parties to behave optimally 
(although NCC, the rule constructed in Section 3, does so). 
Table 1 summarizes these results, along with those of this paper. Model 5 is simply the 
unilateral harm framework analyzed in Section 3, while Model 6 is the bilateral harm model 
from Section 4. For each of these models, the table shows which tort rules lead to socially 
optimal behavior by both I and V. Note that, in addition to the standard rules considered in the 
literature, the table includes NCC, the hypothetical rule derived in Section 3. This is purely for 
purposes of comparison, and is not intended to suggest that NCC is necessarily an appropriate 
rule to adopt in practice. While NCC induces optimal behavior under all the circumstances 
considered, it should be noted that, for Models 1-3, it involves an arbitrary wealth redistribution 
from victims to injurers, without having any behavioral effects. 
Consider the first two rows of Table 1. In Model 1, there is only one externality (I’s 
effect on V’s accident loss); this externality can be internalized by imposing a negligence 
standard on I, and enabling V to sue I to recover her accident losses when this standard is not 
met. Model 2 extends this idea to the case of two externalities (I’s effect on V’s accident loss, 
and V’s effect on I’s accident loss). Here, the externalities can be internalized by imposing a 
negligence standard on each party, and enabling each to sue the other to recover accident losses 
when the standard is not met. Thus, it would seem from the existing literature that tort liability 
rules succeed in internalizing externalities by creating a cause of action for each external effect 
(in contrast, Leong (1989) is a model in which there are two externalities and only one cause of 
action, which leads to nonoptimal behavior). 
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The results of this paper, however, tend to cast some doubt on this generalization. Note, 
for example, that Model 6 (from Section 4) involves four externalities – each party’s effect on 
the other’s accident loss, and each party’s effect on the other’s precaution costs. However, 
liability rules that involve only two causes of action – i.e. which impose a negligence standard on 
each party, and enable the other to sue for accident losses (but not precaution costs) when the 
standard is violated – are sufficient to internalize all four externalities. Similarly, in Model 3, 
there are two externalities (I’s effect on CV and her effect on LV), but they can both be 
internalized by imposing a negligence standard on I, and enabling V to sue to recover LV).  
 One approach to drawing out the implications of these results is the following. Examining 
the totality of Table 1, it appears that tort liability rules can internalize externalities when  
(i) a negligence standard that takes into account all the externalities created by a party, and  
(ii) liability for damages when the standard is violated 
are imposed on each party that generates externalities (regardless of how many externalities that 
party creates). Thus, it is not necessarily required that there be as many causes of action as 
externalities.   
Moreover, comparison of the results of in the unilateral and bilateral harm case with 
parties affecting each others’ costs of precaution reveals something fundamental about the way 
in which torts functions to induce optimal precaution. The critical features of a socially optimal 
tort system are that there is a cause of action against each externalizing party, and that in setting 
that party’s standard of care the court takes into account all external impacts including impacts 
on injury and on cost of precaution. Negligence rules governing torts involving bilateral harm 
can induce socially optimal behavior even in the presence of external effects on the costs of 
precaution because there is always a cause of action available against the externalizing party.  
This is not so in the case of torts involving unilateral harm. 
This formulation explains the results of the previous literature (Models 1 and 2). Note in 
particular that in Leong (1989), there are two parties – I and V – generating externalities, but a 
negligence standard and liability for damages are imposed only on I; thus, there is an externality-
generating party (V) who does not face liability. Essentially similar explanations can be given for 
why Models 4 and 5 lead to suboptimal behavior: V imposes an externality on I’s precaution 
costs, but faces no liability for damages. 
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At first glance, this formulation may seem to run counter to the basic intuition from 
public finance that one policy instrument is needed to achieve each policy objective. Here the 
objectives appear to be internalizing each party’s loss from accidents and internalizing each 
party’s impact on the other’s cost of precaution. In this case, one might think that four policy 
instruments are needed. However, the comparison of results from the unilateral and bilateral 
harm cases show that the objective is actually to induce each party to internalize the costs 
(whether in terms of harm or in terms of increased cost of precaution) that they impose on the 
other party. Thus, with the objectives properly defined, it is apparent that only two instruments 
are needed. The two causes of action involved in torts with bilateral harm provide the two 
needed instruments. Similarly, the optimal mechanism derived above in the unilateral harm case 
also makes use of two policy instruments. It should be emphasized that both elements 
highlighted above – the negligence standard and the liability for damages – are important in the 
internalization of externalities. For instance, consider Model 5 (from Section 3). Rule NdN 
(contributory negligence) imposes negligence standards on both I and V, but a cause of action 
exists only for V. That is, only V is able to recover damages. Thus, as V creates an externality, 
but does not face liability for damages, NdN is incapable of inducing both parties to behave in a 
socially optimal manner. 
  
6) Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this paper has analyzed the consequences that ensue when parties in 
accidents have intrinsically interdependent costs of precaution. This generalization of the 
standard economic analysis of tort rules enables a better understanding of the conditions under 
which torts rules can induce socially optimal precaution. The results show conditions under 
which standard tort rules can fail to induce socially optimal behavior, and result in successful tort 
litigation (even where there is no error, misperception, incomplete information or wealth 
constraints). We develop a tort-like rule that will induce socially optimal precaution under even 
these conditions.  While this rule is unlikely to be functional, it does help illustrate the elements 
necessary for a tort system to induce socially optimal precaution.  The larger contribution of this 
analysis is to identify those elements.  This analysis shows that in order induce socially optimal 
behavior, all that is required of a tort system is that a cause of action be available against every 
externalizing party and that the cause of action involve a standard of care that accounts for all 
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external costs caused by that party. This is exactly what negligence rules do in most cases that 
would come before a court. 
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Appendix 
 
Second Order Conditions: 
 
The following establishes a sufficient set of conditions for the SOCs for the social problem in the 
general case (Eq. 2). The SOCs for the various other programs considered in the paper will be 
satisfied under very similar circumstances.  
 
Let f ≡ CI(x; y) + CV(y; x) + L(x, y) 
The SOCs require that the Hessian is positive semidefinite (i.e. the principal minor determinants 
are all positive). The first principal minor is 
fxx = CIxx(x, y) + CVxx(x, y) + Lxx(x,y) 
Note that, by assumption, CIxx(x, y) > 0 and Lxx(x,y) > 0; thus, imposing the restriction that 
CVxx(x, y) > 0 is sufficient to ensure that fxx > 0. 
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The second pricipal minor determinant is fxxfyy - fxyfyx; assuming that CIyy(x, y) > 0 is sufficient 
to ensure that fyy > 0. In addition, assuming that the cross-partials CIxy(x, y), CIyx(x, y), CVxy(x, 
y), CVyx(x, y), Lxy(x,y), and Lyx(x,y) are all sufficiently small ensures that fxxfyy - fxyfyx > 0. Under 
those conditions, the SOCs for Eq. 2 are satisfied. 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that A1-A4 holds. Then,  
(i) the social optimum (x*, y*) is not a Nash equilibrium under any liability 
rule 
(ii) the unique (suboptimal) equilibrium under N is (x*, yN), where yN ≡ 
argmin CV(y; x*) + L(x*, y) < y* 
(iii) the unique (nonoptimal) equilibrium under NL is (0, yNL), where  
yNL ≡ argmin CV(y; 0) + L(0, y) 
(iv) the unique (nonoptimal) equilibrium under SL is (xSL, 0), where 
xSL ≡ argmin CI(x;0) + L(x,0) 
(v) the unique (suboptimal) equilibrium under SLdN is (xS, y*), where xS ≡ 
argmin CI(x; y*) + L(x, y*) < x* 
(vi) (x*, y*) is not an equilibrium under CN; there will exist suboptimal 
equilibria (xCN, yCN) ≠ (x*, y*) under CN if there exist xCN and yCN that 
(simultaneously) satisfy the following conditions: 
CI(xCN; yCN) + α(xCN, yCN)L(xCN, yCN) ≤ CI(x; yCN) + α(x, yCN)L(x, yCN)  
∀x≠ xCN             (va) 
CV(xCN; yCN) + (1 - α(xCN, yCN))L(xCN, yCN) ≤ CV(xCN; y)  
+ (1 - α( xCN,, y))L(xCN, y) ∀ y≠ yCN      (vb)  
where α(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of liability borne by I when I takes 
precaution x ≤ x* and V takes precaution y ≤ y*17 
(vii) there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium under NdN. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
(i) It will be apparent from the reasoning below (x*, y*) is not an equilibrium under any of the 
rules considered here. 
(ii) Consider N: by satisfying the legal standard of care x*, I avoids all liability, and faces cost 
CI(x*; y), while taking x < x* leads to costs CI(x;y) + L(x, y). Given A4(i), L(x, y) > CI(x*;y) - 
                                                          
17 This is the most general formulation. In fact, CN entails that α(x*, y) = 0. 
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CI(x;y), I’s dominant strategy (for any y) will be to satisfy the standard. Given that I satisfies x*, 
V faces CV(y; x*) + L(x*,y); the FOC for V’s minimization problem differs from the FOC for 
the social planner’s problem in Eq (14). V will take precaution of yN. Thus, (x*, yN) is an 
equilibrium; uniqueness follows as x* is a dominant strategy, and yN is the unique maximizer of 
V’s program. 
To show that yN < y*, recall the FOC for the socially optimal choice of y, y*, above. As CyI(⋅) < 
0 by assumption, it follows that: 
CyV(y*; x*) + Ly(x*, y*) > CyV(yN; x*)  + Ly(x*, yN) 
By assumption, CyyV(⋅) > 0 and Lyy(⋅) > 0. Thus, both the LHS and RHS of the expression above 
represent an increasing function of y, say, f(y), where f(y) ≡ CyV(y; x*) + Ly(x*, y) and f’(y) > 0. 
It follows that, as f(y*) > f(yN), it must be true that yN < y*. 
 
(iii) Under NL, I never faces liability for V’s loss, so her costs are only her cost of precaution, 
CI(x;y), which is minimized by taking x = 0.  Since CIx < 0, this is true for all y.  Given I’s choice 
of x = 0, V faces cost CV(y; 0) + L(0, y), which is minimized by yNL.  Since the FOC for this 
optimization problem, CVy (y; 0) + Ly(0, y) = 0, differs from that of the social planner (eq. 11), 
the victim will not choose the socially optimal level of precaution, yNL ≠ y*.  The outcome (0, 
yNL) will be a unique equilibrium, but it will not be socially optimal. 
 
(iv) Under SL, V is always compensated and bears only his cost of precaution,  CV(y;x), 
regardless of I’s precaution. V minimizes CV(y; x) by taking no precaution, y = 0.  I in turn, faces 
costs, CI(x;0) + L(x,0), which he will minimize by taking precaution xSL. The FOC for this 
minimization problem, CIx(x;0) + Lx(x,0) = 0, differs from the that for the social problem (Eq 
(10)). As a result, I’s precaution, xSL, will differ from the socially optimal precaution, x*.  The 
outcome (xSL,0) will be a unique equilibrium, but will not be socially optimal. 
 
(v) Under SLdN, regardless of I’s action, V can avoid bearing the expected accident loss only by 
taking the socially optimal level of care, y*.  V can either avoid liability by meeting the social 
standard of care, y*, and face only the cost of precaution, CV(y*; x), or can take care y<y* and 
bear both the cost of precaution and the accident loss, CV(y; x) + L(x,y).  As long as A4(ii) is 
satisfied, V will meet the social standard of care, y*.   Given that V takes precaution y*, I will 
face and choose x to minimize both costs of precaution and accident loss, CI(x;y*) + L(x,y*) by 
choice of xS. The FOC for this minimization problem differs from that of the social planner’s 
problem in Eq 13. 
To show that xS < x*: As CxV(⋅) < 0 by assumption, it follows that: 
CxI(x*; y*) + Lx(x*, y*) > CxI(xS; y*) + Lx(xS, y*) 
and therefore (as CxxI(⋅) > 0 and Lxx(⋅) > 0) that xS < x*. 
 
(vi) Consider CN: To show that (x*, y*) is not an equilibrium, suppose that I plays x*. V faces 
CV(y; x*) + L(x*,y) and takes precaution yN. Therefore, (x*, y*) is not an equilibrium.   
To show that (xCN, yCN) ≠ (x*, y*) may be an equilibrium: suppose that Condition (va) holds. 
Then, xCN is I’s best response to V playing yCN. Suppose that Condition (vb) holds. Then, yCN is 
V’s best response to I playing xCN. Thus, if ∃ (xCN, yCN) such that Conditions (va) and (vb) are 
simultaneously satisfied, then (xCN, yCN) is an equilibrium. Furthermore, note that if (xCN, yCN) is 
an equilibrium, then (xCN, yCN) ≠ (x*, y*), as (x*, y*) is not an equilibrium. 
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(vii) Consider NdN: 
- Suppose x = x*: V faces CV(y; x*) + L(x*, y), and thus takes precaution yN < y*. Thus, 
(x*, y*) is not an equilibrium. Moreover, if V takes any level of care below y*, I will face 
no liability, and will thus take no care (x = 0). Thus, there cannot be an equilibrium in 
which I takes x* and V takes y < y*. 
- Suppose x < x*: If A4(ii) holds, V will take y*. Thus, there cannot be an equilibrium in 
which both parties take suboptimal care. Moreover, if V takes y*, I (given A4(I)) will 
take x*; thus, there cannot be an equilibrium in which I takes x < x* and V takes y*.  
This exhausts all the possibilities, so there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose that A1-A4 hold. Then, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (r0, q0) 
under NdN, where: 
),0()0;()0*;()*,(*);(
),0()0;()0*;(0
NNVVNNV
NNVV
yLyCyCyxLxyC
yLyCyCr −−−+
−−=
 and  
0 ( *; ) (0; )
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Proof of Proposition 2: 
 
Consider I’s expected payoff from playing r, given that V plays q: 
– rqCI(x*; y*) – r(1 – q)CI(x*; yN) – (1 – r)(1 – q)CI(0; yN) – (1 – r)q[CI(0; y*) + L(0, y*)] 
Simplifying, the expected payoff is 
r[– qCI(x*; y*) – CI(x*; yN) + qCI(x*; yN) + qCI(0; y*) + qL(0, y*) + CI(0; yN) – qCI(0; yN)] – 
q[CI(0; y*) + L(0, y*)] – (1 – q)CI(0; yN) 
Setting the coefficient of r in the above expression equal to zero, and rearranging, yields q0 (note 
that, using assumptions A1-A4, it follows that q0 ∈ (0,1)). If q > q0, then I’s payoff is increasing 
in r, so that I’s best response r*(q) = 1 (i.e. playing the pure strategy x*). If q < q0, then I’s payoff 
is decreasing in r, so that r*(q) = 0 (i.e. playing the pure strategy 0). If q = q0, then I’s payoff is 
constant in r, so that any r is a best response to V playing q = q0. 
Now consider V’s expected payoff from playing q, given that I plays r: 
q[– r[CV(y*; x*) + L(x*, y*)] - CV(y*;0) + rCV(y*;0) + r[CV(yN; x*) + L(x*, yN)] + CV(yN; 0)  + 
L(0, yN) – r[CV(yN; 0) + L(0, yN)]] - qCV(y*; 0) - CV(yN;0) - L(0, yN) 
Setting the coefficient of q in the above expression equal to zero, and rearranging, yields r0 (note 
that, using assumptions A1-A4, it follows that r0 ∈ (0,1)). If r > r0, then V’s payoff is decreasing 
in q, so that V’s best response q*(r) = 0 (i.e. playing the pure strategy yN). If r < r0, then V’s 
payoff is increasing in q, so that q*(r) = 1 (i.e. playing the pure strategy y*). If r = r0, then V’s 
payoff is constant in q, so that any q is a best response to I playing r = r0. 
In particular, q0 is a best response by V when I plays r0; moreover, from above, r0 is a best 
response by I when V plays q0. Thus, (r0, q0) is a Nash equilibrium. 
To show uniqueness, suppose that there exists an equilibrium (r′, q′), where q′ ≠ q0.  
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If q′ > q0, then r*(q′) = 1. Moreover, q*(1) = 0, so that (r′, q′) = (1, 0). But, this cannot be an 
equilibrium (see proof of Proposition 5.3). 
If q′ < q0, then r*(q′) = 0. Moreover, q*(0) = 1, so that (r′, q′) = (0, 1). But, this cannot be an 
equilibrium (see proof of Proposition 5.3). 
Similar reasoning holds for r′ ≠ r0. Thus, (r0, q0) is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3: Given A1-A4 and the risk-neutrality of I and V, the unique Nash equilibrium 
outcome under NCC is (x*, y*) 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
 
I’s payoff from satisfying x* (for any choice y by V) is: 
[p(x*, y)/p(x*, y)]CI(x*; y) - CI(x*; y) 
   = 0 (for any y) 
while I’s payoff from failing to satisfy x* is: 
   - CI(x; y) - L(x*; y) 
   < 0 
Thus, I always satisfies x*. Given this, V faces costs 
   [p(x*, y)/p(x*, y)]CI(x*; y) + CV(y; x*) + L(x*, y) 
   = CI(x*; y) + CV(y; x*) + L(x*, y) 
But, this is identical to the social planner’s problem in choosing y. Thus, V will choose y*(x*), 
which is unique by assumption. It follows that (x*, y*) is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome.  
 
Assumptions A5-A9: 
A5:  (i)  LV(x, y*) > [CI(x*; y*) + LI(x*, y*)] – [CI(x; y*) + LI(x, y*)] ∀x < x* 
(ii) LI(x*, y) > [CV(x*; y*) + LV(x*, y*)] – [CV(x*; y) + LV(x*, y)] ∀y < y* 
A6: (i) LV(x, y) > [CI(x*; y) – CI(x; y)] ∀x < x* and ∀y < y* 
 (ii) LI(x, y) > [CV(x; y*) – CV(x; y)] ∀x < x* and ∀y < y* 
A7: (i) LI(x, y*) > [CI(x*; y*) + LV(x*, y*)] – [CI(x; y*) + LV(x, y*)] ∀x < x*  
 (ii) LV(x*, y) > [CV(x*; y*) + LI(x*, y*)] – [CV(x*; y) + LI(x*, y)] ∀y < y* 
A8: (i) LI(x, y) > [CI(x*; y) – CI(x; y)] ∀x < x* and ∀y < y* 
 (ii) LV(x, y) > [CV(x; y*) – CV(x; y)] ∀x < x* and ∀y < y* 
It is assumed that under CN, if an accident occurs and both parties are deemed to be negligent, 
then I bears a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the total accident losses, while V bears (1 - α). Then, the 
following assumptions are required: 
A9: (i) α[LI(x, y) + LV(x, y)] > [CI(x*; y) – CI(x; y)] ∀x < x* and ∀y < y* 
 (ii) (1 - α)[LI(x, y) + LV(x, y)] > [CV(x; y*) – CV(x; y)] ∀x < x* and ∀y < y* 
 
Proposition 4: In the bilateral harm model with social costs given by Eq. (6), and given A5-A9, 
the unique Nash equilibrium outcome under all negligence-based liability rules (N, SLdN, NdN 
and CN) is (x*, y*). 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
 
N: Consider I’s problem, assuming that V chooses y*. Then, I faces expected costs  
CI(x*; y*) + LI(x*, y*) 
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by choosing x = x*, and  
    CI(x; y*) + LI(x, y*) + LV(x, y*) 
By choosing x < x*. Given A5(i), I will choose x = x*. Now suppose that V chooses y < y*; 
then, I faces costs CI(x*; y) by choosing x = x*, and CI(x; y) + LV(x, y) by choosing x < x*. 
Given A6(i), I will choose x = x*. Thus, x = x* is a dominant strategy for I. By the symmetry of 
the problem, and given A5(ii) and A6(ii), V will choose y = y*. Hence, the unique equilibrium 
outcome is (x*, y*). 
 
SLdN: Consider I’s problem, assuming that V chooses y = y*. Then, I faces expected costs 
     CI(x*; y*) + LV(x*, y*) 
by choosing x*, and 
    CI(x; y*) + LI(x, y*) + LV(x, y*) 
by choosing x < x*. Given A7(i), I will choose x*. Now suppose that V chooses y < y*; then, I 
faces costs CI(x*; y) by choosing x = x*, and CI(x; y) + LI(x, y) by choosing x < x*. Given A8(i), 
I will choose x = x*. Thus, x = x* is a dominant strategy for I. By the symmetry of the problem, 
and given A7(ii) and A8(ii), V will choose y = y*. Hence, the unique equilibrium outcome is (x*, 
y*). 
 
NdN: Consider I’s problem, assuming that V chooses y = y*. Then, I faces expected costs 
     CI(x*; y*) + LI(x*, y*) 
by choosing x*, and 
    CI(x; y*) + LI(x, y*) + LV(x, y*) 
by choosing x < x*. Given A5(i), I will choose x*. Now suppose that V chooses y < y*; then, I 
faces costs CI(x*; y) by choosing x = x*, and CI(x; y) + LI(x, y) by choosing x < x*. Given A8(i), 
I will choose x = x*. Thus, x = x* is a dominant strategy for I. By the symmetry of the problem, 
and given A5(ii) and A8(ii), V will choose y = y*. Hence, the unique equilibrium outcome is (x*, 
y*). 
 
CN: Consider I’s problem, assuming that V chooses y = y*. Then, I faces expected costs 
     CI(x*; y*) + LI(x*, y*) 
by choosing x*, and 
    CI(x; y*) + LI(x, y*) + LV(x, y*) 
by choosing x < x*. Given A5(i), I will choose x*. Now suppose that V chooses y < y*; then, I 
faces costs CI(x*; y) by choosing x = x*, and α[LI(x; y) + LV(x, y)] by choosing x < x*. Given 
A9(i), I will choose x = x*. Thus, x = x* is a dominant strategy for I. By the symmetry of the 
problem, and given A5(ii) and A9(ii), V will choose y = y*. Hence, the unique equilibrium 
outcome is (x*, y*). 
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Figure 1. Marginal Costs and Benefits of Precaution when MC = MC(x)  
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Figure 2. Marginal Costs and Benefits of Precaution when MC = MC(x,y)  
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Table 1: Summary of Results 
 
 
Liability Rule Model  
      
Example Social Loss Function
NL SL N SLdN NdN CN NCC
1) Unilateral 
harm/independent 
costs 
Shavell 
(1987, pp. 
36f) 
 
CI(x) + CV(y) + LV(x, y) 
   
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
2) Bilateral 
harm/independent 
costs 
Arlen 
(1990a) 
CI(x) + CV(y) + LI(x, y)  
+ LV(x, y) 
   
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
3) Unilateral 
harm/I affects V’s 
costs 
Dharmapala 
et al. (2001) 
 
CI(x) + CV(y; x) + LV(x, y) 
   
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
4) Unilateral 
harm/V affects I’s 
costs 
Dharmapala 
et al. (2001) 
 
CI(x; y) + CV(y) + LV(x, y) 
       
* 
5) Unilateral harm/ 
interdependent 
costs 
Section 3  
CI(x; y) + CV(y; x) + LV(x, y) 
       
* 
6) Bilateral harm/ 
interdependent 
costs 
Section 4 CI(x; y) + CV(y; x) + LI(x, y)  
+ LV(x, y)  
   
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* indicates that the rules induces both I and V to undertake the socially optimal levels of care 
 
Note that these results rely on the various assumptions stated in the text and in the cited works holding (e.g. A1-A4 for Model 5, and 
A5-A9 for Model 6) 
